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Abstract
In contrast to exemplar and decision bound categorization models, the memory and contrast
models described here do not assume that long-term representations of stimulus magnitudes
are available. Instead, stimuli are assumed to be categorized using only their differences from a
few recent stimuli. To test this alternative, sequential effects were examined in a binary
categorization of 10 tones varying in frequency. Stimuli up to two trials back in the sequence
had a significant effect on the response to the current stimulus. Further, the effects of previous
stimuli interacted with one another. A memory and contrast model, according to which only
ordinal information about the differences between the current stimulus and recent preceding
stimuli is utilized, best accounted for these data. 
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Sequence Effects in the Categorization of Tones Varying in Frequency
Exemplar models (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986) and decision-bound
models (e.g., Ashby & Townsend, 1986) are arguably the most successful models of
perceptual categorization. These models have a common representational assumption: They
assume that stimuli can be represented as points or probability distributions within a
multidimensional psychological space. Identification and categorization decisions are then
based on these representations. Implicit in this assumption is the notion that the absolute
magnitudes (on various psychological dimensions, e.g., loudness, brightness, size) of
previously encountered stimuli are available when classifying new stimuli.
There is, however, some evidence to suggest that absolute magnitudes may be
unavailable in the identification and classification of simple perceptual stimuli. For example, in
a series of classic experiments by Garner (1954), participants' judgments of whether
comparison tones were more or less than half as loud as a given reference tone were
completely determined by the range of the comparison tones (see also Helson, 1964). Baird,
Green, and Luce (1980) demonstrated that two-thirds of the variability in loudness estimates
was explained by the variability in the previous estimate when loudnesses were similar,
suggesting that the previous loudness is used as a reference point. Such context effects should
not be evident if participants did have access to absolute magnitude information. Laming
(1997) provided extensive discussion of these and other similar findings
Stewart, Brown, and Chater (2002) suggested that, if absolute magnitude information
is not readily accessible, relative magnitude information might instead provide the basis for
categorization. Indeed, in the absence of absolute magnitude information the only possible
strategy, apart from guessing, is to classify exemplars on the basis of their difference from
previous exemplars. Stewart et al. proposed a memory and contrast (hereafter MAC) model of
binary categorization, according to which a new exemplar is classified into the same category
as an immediately preceding exemplar if it is similar to that exemplar. Alternatively, if the
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preceding and current stimuli differ sufficiently, the current exemplar is classified into the
alternative category. 
The Category Contrast Effect
Stewart et al. (2002) provided some experimental evidence that discriminated between
their MAC account and standard exemplar accounts. The paradigm used was a unidimensional
binary categorization of ten stimuli, where stimuli of one category took low values on the
dimension and stimuli of the other category took high values (see Figure 1). Stewart et al.
found that classification of a borderline stimulus (e.g., 5) was more accurate when
presentation of the borderline stimulus was preceded by a distant member of the opposite
category (e.g., 10) than when it was preceded by a distant member of the same category (e.g.
1). They called this effect the category contrast effect. 
Stewart et al. (2002) showed that existing exemplar models predict the opposite result.
In exemplar models the probability of responding with a given category label is given by the
summed similarity of a target exemplar to members of that category, divided by the summed
similarity of the target exemplar to members of all competing categories (i.e., in accordance
with Luce's, 1959, choice model). If the plausible assumption that stimuli on recent trials are
weighted more heavily than those on less recent trials is made (e.g., Nosofsky & Palmeri,
1997), the effect of the immediately preceding exemplar, no matter how dissimilar to the
current exemplar, is to increase the summed similarity of the current exemplar to the previous
exemplar's category. Thus, according to an exemplar model, a borderline stimulus should be
classified more accurately after a distant member of the same category compared to a distant
member of the opposite category - the opposite of the category contrast effect. 
A MAC strategy does, however, predict the category contrast effect. The similarity
between a borderline stimulus and a distant stimulus, either from the same category or the
opposite category, is low. Thus, when a borderline stimulus is preceded by a distant stimulus
the memory and contrast strategy predicts responding with the opposite category label to that
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of the previous stimulus: When the previous stimulus is from the same category, accuracy for
responding to the current stimulus will be low, and when the previous stimulus is from the
opposite category accuracy for responding to the current stimulus will be high - consistent
with the category contrast effect.
Sequential Effects
The purpose of this article is to examine how a MAC strategy might be generalized to
include information from recent stimuli other than the preceding stimulus. There is good
evidence to suggest that sequential effects in categorization and related tasks are not limited to
the immediately preceding stimulus. Stimuli further back in the sequence also have an effect.
For example, in absolute identification tasks stimuli that vary along a unidimensional
psychological continuum (e.g., the loudness of a tone or the length of a line) are each
associated with a unique label. Normally labels are stimulus ranks. In identifying a current
stimulus there is a strong assimilative effect to the immediately preceding stimulus (Garner,
1953; Holland & Lockhead, 1968; Hu, 1997; Lacouture, 1997; Lockhead, 1984; Luce,
Nosofsky, Green, & Smith, 1982; Mori, 1989; Mori & Ward, 1995; Purks, Callahan, Braida,
& Durlach, 1980; Staddon, King, & Lockhead, 1980; Ward & Lockhead, 1970, 1971). In
other words, participants are systematically biased to judge the current stimulus as nearer to
the previous stimulus than it really is. The effect of stimuli further back in the sequence is the
opposite: that is, there is a contrast effect (Holland & Lockhead, 1968; Lacouture, 1997;
Ward & Lockhead, 1970, 1971). The contrast effect is smaller in magnitude, and decreases for
less recent stimuli, but can be observed for up to the previous five or six stimuli (but see
Jestead, Luce, & Green,1977, for an argument that such effects are not direct, but propagated
to the current trial through successive responses).
 Furthermore, these sequence effects are not due to drifting in responding. Petzold and
Haubensak (2001) examined sequential effects in a categorization task with five categories.
Stimuli were squares varying in size. There was a significant correlation between stimuli and
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responses up to six trials back. These correlations were compared to the expected size of
pseudo-sequential effects caused by individual participants showing a drift in their use of the
response scale across the experiment. The sequential effects were significantly greater than the
expected pseudo-sequential effects up to a lag of two for category judgments.
In summary, in psychophysical tasks there is good evidence that it is not just the
immediately preceding stimulus that affects the response on the current trial, but also stimuli
further back in the sequence too. If MAC models are to become viable models of
categorization then they must offer an account of these sequential effects. We begin by
considering how MAC models might be developed to account for the effects of many
preceding trials and not just the immediately preceding trial. We then present the predictions
of these models. Finally, we present data from a new categorization experiment and use these
data to test the models that we have proposed. 
Alternative Models
In presenting the alternative models we begin by briefly outlining the original MAC
model. We then present some motivation and discussion of the key assumptions in the models
we propose before presenting the models and their predictions. We refer to the current trial as
trial n, the previous trials as trial n-1, and the kth most recent trial as trial n-k. The physical
magnitude of the stimulus on trial n-k is denoted Xn-k, the psychological magnitude Sn-k, the
response Rn-k, and the feedback Fn-k.
The Original MAC Model
According to the original MAC model proposed by Stewart et al. (2002), participants
are assumed to base their categorization decision for Sn on Fn-1 and on the difference d
between Sn and Sn-1. In some cases the sign of the difference is sufficient to determine the
response. For example, consider the category structure in Figure 1. If Fn-1 is Category A, and
Sn-1  Sn then Sn must also belong to Category A. This is the case whenever Sn  Sn-1  5 (or
when Sn  Sn-1  6 for Category B). When the sign of d is not sufficient to determine the
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category of the Sn, then the magnitude of d is used to generate a probability of repeating the
Fn-1 as Rn. When d is small the probability of repeating the label is high and when d is large the
probability of repeating the label is small. Originally a Gaussian function was used to relate the
distance d to the probability of responding on the current trial with the category label (i.e.,
feedback) from the previous trial. 
P Rn=F n1=e
cd 2 (1)
The free parameter c determines the size of the difference required to give a change in
category label by determining how quickly the probability of repeating the previous category
label decreases as the difference between the previous and current stimuli increases. Despite
making no use of absolute magnitude information, and despite relating the current stimulus
only to the immediately preceding stimulus and feedback, such a model can do surprisingly
well, achieving, for example, around 85% correct classification performance in binary
classification of 10 stimuli (Stewart et al., 2002). 
No Long-Term Memory for Absolute Magnitudes
Consistent with the original MAC model (Stewart et al., 2002), we assume that long-
term memory traces representing the absolute magnitudes of stimulus attributes are
unavailable, or at least unused. We make this strong assumption primarily to demonstrate that
models without long-term representation of absolute magnitude information naturally predict
the sequential effects observed. This theoretical standpoint is in direct contrast to the
representational assumptions of exemplar and decision-bound models of perceptual
categorization. Thus our purpose is not to claim that absolute magnitude information is never
available or used. Rather, our aim is to show that a natural account of sequence effects in
binary categorization of unidimensional stimuli can be provided without such an assumption.
In the models that we describe below we assume that absolute magnitude information is
available for, at most, a few recent stimuli. An alternative possibility is that this absolute
magnitude information is available for only the immediately preceding stimulus, and that
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differences between the current stimuli and earlier stimuli are deduced by summing intervening
consecutive differences. We shall return to this possibility in the discussion. 
Quality of Difference Information
A key theoretical question concerns the nature of the difference information used by
participants. Stewart et al. (2002) assumed that the sign and magnitude of the difference Sn -
Sn-1 is available. (If the psychological percept of a magnitude is related to the physical
magnitude by a logarithmic transformation, as in Fechner's law, then this assumption
corresponds to assuming that only the ratio of the physical magnitudes Xn / Xn-1 is available.)
An alternative and stronger assumption is that only the sign of the difference between
successive stimuli is available, and not the magnitude of the difference. In other words,
participants are only able to make ordinal judgments, judging whether Sn is greater than,
approximately equal to, or smaller than Sn-1. Laming (1984, 1997) made a similar claim, and
suggested that two additional judgments could be made - 'much greater than' and 'much
smaller than.' Laming argued that the assumption that one can only make such judgments is
sufficient to account for many of the key phenomena in psychophysics. Here we consider both
models where only the sign information is used and models where both the sign and the
magnitude of stimulus differences are used.
In some cases, if the sign of the difference between Sn and Sn-1 is known the category of
the current stimulus can be determined from the category of the previous stimulus. Using only
the sign of the difference between stimuli might seem unlikely to lead to high levels of
performance. However, if one only has access to the sign of the difference between Sn and Sn-1
(not the magnitude) and Fn-1 then this strategy does predict a perform above chance (50%) on
random sequences of stimuli in a binary categorization with a single category bound (e.g., the
category structure in Figure 1). For large set sizes (N > 10), average accuracy is about 63%
correct, although this performance rises to 69% correct for smaller set sizes (N = 4). Here we
extend this idea: In general, for a binary categorization with a single category boundary b, we
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shall call Sn-k sign-useful whenever Sn  Sn-k < b or Sn  Sn-k > b. Note that a participant need
know only the sign of the difference between Sn and Sn-k, the feedback from trial n-k, and the
ordering of the categories on the dimension for Sn-k to be sign-useful. Knowledge of the
category bound is not necessary. 
Selection and Integration of Information from Previous Trials
A separate theoretical issue is how information from several previous trials might be
selected or combined to inform responding on trial n. One possibility is that information from
several previous trials is independently combined; a second possibility is that only some of this
information is selected and used.
The first possibility can be excluded on the grounds that it does not lead to improved
overall accuracy for any model. The argument proceeds as follows. Assume that the
proportion of correct responses on trial n is given by a weighted sum of the independent
contributions of comparisons with K previous trials:
w1f S n1w2f S n2...wK f S nK  (2)
where wk is the weight for trial n-k, 
k=1
K
wk=1 , and f(Sn-k) is the accuracy on trial n if only
Sn-k is used. Averaging over all possible values of each previous stimulus gives an average




f S  (3)
where Si is the psychological magnitude of the ith of N stimuli. This sum is independent of the
weighting used. Thus, only weighting Sn-1 produces the same overall accuracy as including
information from more previous stimuli. In other words, when the effects of information from
previous trials are independent of one another, including information from previous trials does
not increase the overall accuracy of categorization. Intuitively, this can be understood as
follows. When a given previous stimulus is either particularly helpful (or particularly
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unhelpful) in classifying the current stimulus, the advantage (or disadvantage) it gives will be
diluted when combined with information from other previous stimuli.
The preceding argument rules out any model where the weights allocated to
information from previous trials are independent from the stimuli on those trials. An
alternative possibility is that the attention paid to a given previous trial will depend on the
usefulness of that previous trial relative to other previous trials. For example, comparison
might be made to Sn-3 when and only when comparisons to Sn-1 and Sn-2 are not useful. Some
evidence consistent with this possibility is provided by Petzold and Haubensak (2001). In their
examination of sequential effects described above they obtained an interaction between the
effects of the two previous trials. Specifically, the correlation between Rn and Rn-1 was lower
when Sn-2's magnitude was located in between Sn and Sn-1's. Similarly, the correlation between
Rn and Rn-2 was lower when Sn-1's magnitude was located between Sn and Sn-2's. This suggests
that when Sn-1 is nearer Sn than Sn-2, Sn-2 is relied on less and when Sn-2 is nearer Sn than Sn-1, Sn-1
is relied on less. 
In the light of these considerations, in the models we present below we assume that
there is a context-dependent selection of the use of stimulus information from particular
previous trials.
Availability of Previous Stimuli
In extending the MAC account, we assume that each previous stimulus Sn-k (k > 0) and
corresponding category label can be utilized in categorizing the current stimulus Sn with
probability pn-k. For simplicity, these events are assumed to be independent of one another
(although this is not a core assumption). Once k is larger than 3 or 4, it is assumed that the
probabilities become very small. This corresponds to our assumption that only short-term
representations of the absolute magnitudes of stimuli are available, from, at most, a few trials
ago. Thus, on each trial, one of a series of possible states will occur, with each state
corresponding to the pattern of availability or otherwise of previous stimuli. In general, if any
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of the past K stimuli can be recalled there will be 2K states. This assumption forms the basis for
all of the MAC models that we present below.
Table 1A provides an example when up to three previous stimuli can be utilized. The
top row represents the state where no previous stimuli are recalled. The second row represents
the state where Sn-1 cannot be recalled, Sn-2 cannot be recalled, and Sn-3 is recalled. The final
row represents the state with probability p1 p2 p3 where all previous stimuli (up to Sn-3) can be
recalled. 
The Models1
We are now in a position to describe three variants of the MAC model. In all of the
models that we present, we assume that, if a sign-useful stimulus can be recalled, the current
stimulus is correctly classified. Consider the example in Table 1B, when the sequence of
stimuli, from Sn-3 to Sn, is {Stimulus 2, Stimulus 5, Stimulus 7, Stimulus 3}. For the category
structure in Figure 1, when classifying Stimulus 3, any of Stimuli 3, 4, or 5 are sign-useful.
Thus, whenever Sn-2 = 5 is recalled, as it is in States 3, 4, 7, and 8 (numbering rows from top
to bottom), then we assume that participants will respond with the correct Rn. 
The models differ only in what happens if no sign-useful stimulus is available. We
present four models. If, in a given state, no sign-useful stimulus is recalled then: (a) Rn is
guessed (Guessing Model); (b) Fn-1 is given as Rn with probability psame (Feedback Repetition
Model); (c) the feedback from the last recalled stimulus is given with probability psame or if no
stimulus can be recalled, Rn is guessed (Recalled Stimulus Model); and (d) the magnitude of
the difference between Sn and the last recalled stimulus is used to generate a response
according to Equation 1 or if no stimulus can be recalled, Rn is guessed (Sign and Magnitude
Model). The original MAC model is a special case of model (d) if only Sn-1 is assumed to be
available. The first three models are Sign-Only Models, and the last model is a Sign and
Magnitude Model. 
Continuing the example in Table 1B, according to the Guessing Model, Rn will be
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guessed in States 1, 2, 5, and 6. According to the Feedback Repetition Model, as Fn-1 =
Category B, Category B will be given as Rn in States 1, 2, 5, and 6 with probability psame.
When psame = .5 each category is equally likely. Thus, the Guessing Model is a special case of
the Feedback Repetition Model. The Recalled Stimulus Model predicts that the response will
be guessed in State 1, that in State 2 Category A (the category of the last remembered
stimulus Sn-3 = 2) will be given as Rn with probability psame , and that in States 5 and 6 Category
A (the category of the last remembered stimulus Sn-1 = 7) will be given as Rn with probability
psame . In the remaining states, States 3, 4, 7 and 8, one of the stimuli is sign-useful and the
correct response is given, as described in the previous paragraph. The Sign and Magnitude
Model predicts that the response will be guessed in State 1, in State 2 Category A will be
given as Rn with probability ec 32
2
, and in States 5 and 6 Category B will be given as Rn
with probability ec 37
2
. In the remaining states, States 3, 4, 7 and 8, one of the stimuli is
sign-useful and the correct response is given.
Model Predictions
Model predictions were generated for each of the models outlined above. For a given
model and a given sequence of stimuli, the probability of a correct response can be obtained in
three steps. First, the probability of each possible state is calculated. Second, the probability
that the model would produce the correct answer in each state is calculated. Third, the
probability of being correct is obtained by multiplying the probability of being correct in a state
by the probability of that state and then summing over all states. Figures 2-4 show the
predictions of the Feedback Repetition Model, the Recalled Stimulus Model, and the Sign and
Magnitude Model for the category structure illustrated in Figure 1. (As the Guessing Model is
a special case of the Feedback Repetition Model its predictions are omitted.) In these
simulations, we assumed that only the previous three stimuli could be recalled, with
probabilities p1 = .9, p2 = .6 and p3 = .3. We assumed that psame = .4 for the Feedback
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Repetition Model and the Recalled Stimulus Model, and c = 0.5 for the Sign and Magnitude
Model. 
The predictions for the Feedback Repetition Model are shown in Figure 2. The
probability of a correct Rn as a function of Sn-1 (averaging across all possible earlier stimuli) is
shown for different Sn. (Lines for values of Sn > 5 have been omitted for clarity, but can be
generated by reflecting the figure about the line Sn-1 = 5.5.) When Sn  Sn-1  5 (or Sn  Sn-1 
6) then Sn-1 is sign-useful. These cases are represented by the high levels of performance above
a .9 chance of being correct. (The probability of being correct is less than 1.0 because Sn-1 is
only available 90% of the time. The probability of being correct is greater than .9 because
when Sn-1 is not available, using earlier stimuli does not always results in an error.) The
remaining points correspond to cases where Sn-1 is not sign-useful. In these cases, Sn-2 or Sn-3
may be available (with respective chances of .6 and .3). The probability that one of these
earlier stimuli is useful depends on Sn (but not Sn-1): When Sn is small (e.g., 1) then there are
many possible values of Sn-2 or Sn-3 that might be useful (e.g., 2-5); when Sn is larger (e.g., 5)
then there are fewer values of Sn-2 or Sn-3 that are useful (e.g., only 5). The dependency on the
value of Sn as to whether a previous stimulus is useful gives the spreading of the lines in the
figure, with better performance for extreme Sn. 
When Sn-1 is not useful and if the psame =.5 (i.e., Rn is guessed if no sign-useful stimulus
can be recalled as in the Guessing Model), then the probability of being correct does not
depend on the value of Sn-1. When Sn-1 is not sign-useful and psame > .5 then the probability of a
correct response is higher if Sn-1 is from the same category as Sn. When psame < .5, then the
probability of being correct is higher if Sn-1 is from the opposite category to Sn. In this case, the
category contrast effect is predicted. Accuracy is also higher when psame < .5. The optimal
value of psame = .0. In other words, if no previous stimulus is sign-useful, the best thing to do is
give the opposite of Fn-1 as Rn. This is because when no previous stimulus is sign-useful the
correct answer is most often the opposite of the feedback from the previous trial. 
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In Figure 2B performance is plotted as a function of Sn-2 (rather than Sn-1 as in Figure
2A). Sn-2 has a smaller effect than Sn-1 because Sn-2 is available less often. When Sn-2 is not sign-
useful, then the probability of a correct response does not depend on Sn-2. Hence the
probability of being correct when Sn-2 < Sn-1 is the same as when Sn-2 > 5. 
In Figure 2C an example is provided for Sn = 4 to show the interaction between Sn-1
and Sn-2. If one averages over Sn-2 (i.e., collapses the plane onto the Sn-1 axis) then one obtains
the Sn = 4 line in Figure 2A. If one averages over Sn-1 one obtains the Sn = 4 line in Figure 2B.
The ridge labeled A represents predicted high accuracy performance when Sn-1 is sign-useful
(i.e., Sn-1 = 4 or 5). The ridge labeled B represents the case when Sn-2 is sign-useful. This ridge
is of lower accuracy than ridge A because Sn-2 is assumed to be available less often than Sn-1.
Where the two ridges intersect and both Sn-1 and Sn-2 are useful, it is very likely that at least one
will be recalled, and accuracy is very high. The plateaus labeled C-F represent cases when
neither Sn-1 or Sn-2 is sign-useful. For plateaus C and D, Sn-1 is from the opposite category to Sn
and so the correct answer is to give the opposite of Fn-1 as Rn. As psame = .4 the correct answer
is given 1 - .4 = .6 of the time. For plateaus E and F, Sn-1 is from the same category as Sn and
so the correct answer is to give Fn-1 as Rn. Thus the correct answer is given .4 of the time. 
The Feedback Repetition and Recalled Stimulus models make very similar predictions.
The only difference between the two models is that if no sign-useful previous stimulus can be
remembered in the Feedback Repetition Model then Fn-1 is repeated with some probability and
in the Recalled Stimulus Model then the feedback to the last remembered stimulus is repeated
with some probability. Given that the previous stimulus is very likely to have been recalled, in
practice the two models are almost equivalent. The only difference is that Sn-2 does have a
small effect when no useful stimulus can be recalled in the Recalled Stimulus Model (i.e., the
horizontal components of Figure 3B are not constrained to be of equal value on the left and
right of the figure, as in Figure 2B). Apart from this small difference, the properties of the
predictions do not differ between the two models. For this reason, we do not consider the
Sequence Effects     15
Recalled Stimulus Model further and instead will focus on the simpler Feedback Repetition
Model.
In the Sign and Magnitude Model, the signs and magnitudes of differences between the
current stimulus and recent previous stimuli are available, rather than just the signs of the
differences as in the other models. If none of the previous stimuli that are recalled are sign-
useful, then the difference from the last remembered stimulus is used. The smaller the
difference, the more likely that the category label feedback from the last stimulus is given in
response; the bigger the difference the more likely that the response will be the category that
was not indicated by the previous trial's feedback. Figure 4 shows the predictions of the Sign
and Magnitude Model with the same availability of previous stimuli as in the previous two
simulations. 
Figure 4A plots the probability of a correct Rn as a function of Sn-1 (averaging across all
possible earlier stimuli) for different Sn. When Sn-1 is sign-useful (i.e., Sn  Sn-1  5 or Sn  Sn-1
 6) then performance is high, as in the Sign Only Models. When Sn-1 is not useful, then
accuracy depends on the difference between Sn-1 and Sn. When Sn-1 is similar to Sn, then the
probability of giving Fn-1 as Rn is high. Thus, when Sn-1 = 6 and Sn = 5, this will lead to errors as
the two stimuli come from opposite categories. As Sn-1 increases above 6, the difference grows
and the model predicts that swapping, which is the correct response, is more likely. When Sn-1
= 4 and Sn = 5, then, as the two stimuli are similar, Fn-1 is repeated as Rn, leading to accurate
performance. As Sn-1 decreases below 4, the difference increases, and swapping, which is
incorrect, becomes more likely. The Sign and Magnitude Model thus necessarily predicts the
category contrast effect. Figure 4B shows the same qualitative pattern of performance as a
function of Sn-2 not Sn-1. The pattern is greatly attenuated, as Sn-2 is assumed to be available less
often than Sn-1. 
Figure 4C is analogous to Figures 2C and 3C. In Figures 2C and 3C, when Sn-1 and Sn-2
are not useful, only the category of the previous stimuli is important (i.e., regions C-F are
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plateaus). However, in the Sign and Magnitude Models, the difference between stimuli, rather
than just the category of the previous stimuli, determines responding. Thus, in the same
regions, performance is predicted to vary as a function of the magnitudes of Sn-1 and Sn-2 (or,
more specifically, the differences from Sn, but Sn is held constant at 4 in this plot). The
explanation of this pattern is as above.
Experiment
In the previous modeling section, we outlined two categories of model. In one model,
only the sign of the difference between previous stimuli was available. In the other model, both
the sign and the difference of the previous stimulus was available. These two classes of models
necessarily make quite different predictions. The Sign Only Models predict that, when no
previous stimulus is sign-useful, only the category of previous stimuli will influence responding
on the current trial. The Sign and Difference Models predict that, when no previous stimulus is
sign-useful, the magnitude of the previous stimuli will have a continuous effect. The purpose
of this experiment is to test these two contrasting accounts. For this purpose, participants
classified a truly random sequence of stimuli to examine the effects of previous stimuli on
classification of the current stimulus. 
Method
Participants. Sixteen undergraduate psychology students volunteered to participate.
Stimuli. Ten 500-ms sine-wave tones of differing frequency were used as stimuli in this
experiment. Each tone was 6% higher in frequency than the tone immediately lower in
frequency, and thus the tones were equally spaced on a log-frequency scale. The first tone had
a frequency of 768.70 Hz, and the last tone had a frequency of 1298.70 Hz. The 10 tones
were divided into two categories, with the 5 lowest frequency tones in one category, and the 5
highest frequency tones in the other category. The amplitude of stimuli was linearly ramped
from zero to maximum in the first 50 ms of the stimulus and from maximum to zero in the last
50 ms of the stimulus to prevent click artifacts at the stimulus onset and offset. Stimuli were
Sequence Effects     17
transduced using a Creative Labs Ensoniq CT5880 audio PCI sound card and Sennheiser
eH2270 headphones.
Procedure. Participants were tested one at a time in a quiet room. Participants were
informed that they would hear a number of tones, one after the other. They were told that low
tones belonged to one category and high tones belonged to another, and that after each tone
they would be asked to respond with the category they thought the tone came from. Although
at first participants would have to guess, they were informed that by attending to the correct
answer displayed on the screen after each response, they could learn which tones belonged to
which category. They were given an opportunity to ask the experimenter questions before the
experiment began.
Each trial began with a tone randomly selected (with replacement) from the set. A '?'
prompt appeared on the screen with the onset of the tone. From the onset of the tone
participants were able to respond with either 'Z' or 'X' (labeled 'A' and 'B' respectively) on a
standard keyboard. The assignment of labels to categories was counterbalanced across
participants. The '?' prompt disappeared immediately after participants responded. After the
participants had responded or 500 ms after the offset of the tone, whichever was later, the
correct answer (either 'A' or 'B') was displayed on the screen for 500 ms. Feedback was given
throughout the experiment. There was a 500-ms pause before the next trial began. There were
six blocks each of 100 trials. Participants were given a break between each block. 
Results
Accuracy. Figure 5 shows the proportion of correct responses as a function of Sn.
Performance has been averaged across the two categories, so that the abscissa represents the
stimuli furthest from the category bound on the left and those closest on the right.
Performance is highest on the extreme stimuli and decreases monotonically to be lowest for
the borderline stimuli, F(4, 60) = 188.93, p < .0001 (one-way univariate ANOVA). 
Sequence effects. Figure 6 shows the interaction between current and previous stimuli.
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Figure 6A shows the interaction between Sn and Sn-1. When Sn-1 is sign-useful, accuracy is high.
Otherwise, accuracy depends only on the category of Sn-1, with higher accuracy when Sn-1
belongs to the opposite category to Sn, consistent with the original category contrast effect. A
two-way univariate ANOVA was run, with factors Sn and Sn-1. There was a main effect of Sn,
F(4, 52) = 176.10, p < .0001. There was a main effect of Sn-1, F(9, 117) = 3.92 , p = .0002.
There was also significant interaction, F(36, 468) = 4.27, p < .0001. Figure 6B shows the
interaction between Sn and Sn-2. Another two-way univariate ANOVA was run, with factors Sn
and Sn-2. There was a main effect of Sn, F(4, 40) = 129.36, p < .0001. There was a main effect
of Sn-2, F(9, 90) = 4.42 , p < .0001. There was also significant interaction, F(36, 360) = 1.66,
p = .0117.2 Effects of Sn-3 and Sn-4 and their interactions with Sn were examined. Although the
pattern of data was similar to that for Sn-1 and Sn-2, the effects and interactions were not
significant: largest F(1, 117) = 1.62, p = .1162. We think that it is likely that significant effects
would be found in a more powerful experiment.
The category contrast effect. It is possible to test the category contrast effect observed
by Stewart et al. (2002). Recall that the category contrast effect is defined as more accurate
categorizations of a borderline stimulus following a distant stimulus from the opposite
category compared to a distant stimulus from the same category. This effect can be examined
in the current data by comparing accuracy for Sn = 5 (the borderline stimulus) in Figure 6A
when Sn-1 = 10 (distant stimulus from the opposite category) and when Sn-1 = 1 (the distant
stimulus from the same category). A t-test shows that although the direction of the difference
is consistent with the category contrast effect, the difference is not significant, one tailed t(15)
= 1.26, p = .1143.3 However, we have already noted that only the category of Sn-1 seems to
matter. When performance averaged over 1  Sn-1  4 is compared to performance averaged
over 7  Sn-1  10, performance is higher when Sn-1 is from the opposite category, consistent
with the category contrast effect, one tailed t(15) = 2.53, p = .0116. A similar analysis was
performed for Sn-2. The category contrast effect was significant when only extreme values of
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Sn-2 were used in the comparison, one tailed t(15) = 2.63, p = .0094, and when only the
category of Sn-2 was used, one tailed t(15) = 2.01, p = .0316.
Conditional sequence effects. A strong prediction of the MAC models described here
is that when a previous stimulus is recalled and is sign-useful, other previous stimuli will have
no effect.4 To investigate this prediction was assumed that Sn-1 is nearly always available.
Performance is plotted as a function of Sn and Sn-2 in Figures 7A and B. Performance when Sn-1
is sign-useful is plotted in Figure 7A and when Sn-1 is not sign-useful in Figure 7B. (Note that
few data are available for the line Sn = 5, as it is quite rare that Sn-1 is useful when Sn = 5: Some
of the data points are based on as few as 10 responses, and hence the standard error of the
mean is large.) As we are assuming that Sn-1 is almost always available, Sn-2 should have no
effect when Sn-1 is sign useful and Sn-2 should have an effect when Sn-1 is not sign-useful. This is
the pattern that is observed. Figures 7C and D contain the analogous examination of the effect
of Sn-1 when Sn-2 is sign-useful (Figure 7C) and is not sign-useful (Figure 7D). We have no way
of knowing whether Sn-2 was available to participants on each of these trials, as we have no
independent measure of the availability of stimuli (we do not assume that Sn-2 is nearly always
available). Thus, although Sn-2 was potentially useful on all of the trials that contributed to
Figure 7C, it was not always available. Thus we predict an attenuated effect of Sn-1 in Figure
7C compared to Figure 7D. This is the pattern that is observed.
Discussion
The purpose of this experiment was to examine the effect of previous stimuli on
classification of a current stimulus in a binary categorization. We found large effects of
previous trials, and interactions between these effects that were consistent with the predictions
of Sign-Only MAC models.5 Specifically, if Sn-k was sign-useful (i.e., using only the sign of the
difference between Sn-k and Sn allowed the category of Sn to be determined) then Rn was
accurate and unaffected by other preceding stimuli. An interaction of this sort is entirely
consistent with the interaction found by Petzold and Haubensak (2001). When Sn-k was not
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sign-useful, only the category of Sn-k determined responding, as assumed in the Sign-Only
MAC models. As we found an effect of the category of Sn-2, this rules out Guessing and
Feedback Repetition models which do not predict this effect (these models specify that when
no sign-useful previous stimulus is available, then either Rn is guessed, or Fn-1 is repeated with
some probability - both predict no effect of Sn-2).
The category contrast effect was also replicated: when Sn-k was not sign useful, Rn was
more accurate when Sn-k was from the opposite category. However, we found no evidence that
the magnitude of the difference between stimuli was utilized, as was assumed in the original
MAC model (Stewart, et al., 2002). It seems that this original explanation of the category
contrast effect must be modified. The explanation offered here is that of the Recalled Stimulus
MAC model: that is, when no previous stimulus is sign-useful, it is optimal for the feedback
from the last recalled stimulus to be repeated with probability psame < .5. When this is the case
then the Recalled Stimulus MAC model predicts greater accuracy. 
Sequential effects have been examined extensively in the magnitude estimation
paradigm which was popularized by Stevens. Typically, in multiple regression analyses,
current responses are contrasted with previous stimuli and assimilated towards previous
responses (e.g., Jestead et al., 1977; Ward, 1982, 1985, 1987). Our category contrast effect is
also an example of a contrastive relationship between the previous stimulus and the current
response, albeit in a different task. The true nature of the relationship between the previous
stimulus and the current response in magnitude estimation tasks may not be contrastive.
Instead, the negative coefficient of Sn-1 revealed in many multiple regression analyses may
confound a (possibly additive or assimilative) perceptual effect of Sn-1 with a hidden
autocorrelated error in the judgment process (DeCarlo, 1992, 1994; DeCarlo & Cross, 1990).
This possibility goes some way towards reconciling the assimilation seen in absolute
identification with the contrast seen in magnitude estimation and in our own categorization
task. We return to this possibility below. 
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Not all authors find a contrastive effect of the previous stimulus. In magnitude
estimations of length and numerousness, Morris and Rule (1988) found that the correlation
between the deviation from the mean response to a given stimulus on the current trial and the
previous stimulus was very small. Morris and Rule accounted for their lack of a contrast effect
compared to that found by previous authors by suggesting that the contrastive relationship is a
sensory effect that would differ between different stimulus continua (p. 72). This account may
well explain the discrepancy between our results and Morris and Rules's. An alternative is to
note that in magnitude estimation tasks, to the extent that participants can perform the task,
stimulus magnitudes and responses are correlated. As the effects of previous stimuli and
responses on the current response are opposite, they may well have canceled out in Morris and
Rule's data (for an example of such cancellation, see Schifferstein & Frijters, 1992).
Haubensak (1992a) also failed to find an effect of preceding stimuli. Haubensak had
participants judge the size of 10 squares using six categories without feedback. To investigate
whether contrast effects occurred, Haubensak varied the sequential dependencies. For one
group of participants, the probability with which the current stimulus came from the same half
of the continuum was .75 and for another group it was .25. Haubensak found that the ratings
given to each square did not differ between the two groups. Under the hypothesis of contrast
between successive stimuli, ratings should have been higher for the first half of the scale and
lower for the second half of the scale for the .75 Group (as in the .75 Group the preceding
stimulus more likely to have been from the same half of the continuum). However, a
contrastive model only predicts very small differences in this paradigm. For example, if the 10
stimuli are assumed to be evenly spaced psychologically and contrast is set to be 10% of the
difference between stimuli, then the mean rating for squares differ by only 0.14 on a six point
rating scale between the two groups. Further, although Haubensak found that the previous
stimuli did not systematically bias the current response, if previous stimuli are similar, the error
in the current response is greatly reduced, at least in absolute identification of loudness (Luce
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et al., 1982; Nosofsky, 1983) and length (Hu, 1997). 
Jestead et al. (1977) argued that sequential effects in psychophysical tasks such as
magnitude estimation, absolute identification, and categorization extend to only the
immediately preceding stimulus. They describe the notion that the effects may extend to
stimuli further back in the sequence as "appalling" (p. 92) and "disturbing" (p. 93). They argue
that the depth of sequential effects observed by Lockhead and his colleagues (e.g., Holland &
Lockhead, 1968; Ward & Lockhead, 1970, 1971; Ward, 1972, 1973) are artifactual and that
only the immediately preceding influence affects responding on the current trial. They argue
that deeper sequential effects are in fact caused by a propagation of errors in responding to
subsequent stimuli (see also DeCarlo, 1992, 1994; DeCarlo & Cross, 1990). For example, Sn-2
and Rn-2 would affect Rn-1, which in turn would affect Rn. Sn-2 would not directly affect Rn. In
the present data, we have found significant sequential effects up to a depth of two previous
trials (consistent with Petzold & Haubensak, 2001, though their task was different). However,
responses contained only one bit of information (either Category A or B). When Sn-2 is from
the same category as Sn, sometimes Sn-2 will be sign-useful and sometimes it will not. Fn-2 or
Rn-2 do not contain this information. Thus it is hard to see how information about Sn-2 can be
propagated to the current trial through consecutive responses. The "appalling" and
"disturbing" alternative is that Sn-2 directly affects Rn, as we assume in extending the MAC
model to account for these effects. A second alternative is to postulate an intermediate
decision scale that lies between a sensory scale and a response scale, breaking with the
traditional form of Stevens (1957) assumption that responses are directly proportional to the
sensation magnitude. This might well be the case in our binary categorization task. Sequential
effects could then be propagated through successive errors in judgment error on the decision
scale that would not be observed on the much coarser binary response scale. However, if this
is the case, why is the difference magnitude information that would be available from the
postulated decision scale not used in judgment?
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General Discussion
In this article we have considered how the MAC strategy might be extended to
account for the effects of not only the immediately preceding stimulus, but also other recent
stimuli. There are several psychological axioms that lie behind the extension of the model.
First, information about the absolute magnitudes of stimulus properties is only available from
the short-term memory representations of very recent trials. We have assumed, for the
purposes of illustration, that there are no long-term representations of absolute magnitudes.
Second, the differences between recent stimuli and the current stimulus are used to classify the
current stimulus. We tested two alternatives here: (a) that only the sign of the differences is
utilized or (b) that both the sign and magnitude of the differences are utilized. Third,
information from each preceding trial is not used independently, but instead there is an
interaction, such that whether or not information from one previous trial is used depends on
other previous trials. The data that we presented in the Experiment are most consistent with
the idea that only the sign of differences between the current stimulus and preceding stimuli is
utilized, at least for the present category structure and stimuli, and that this information is used
in a context-dependent way. Before closing this article we address some of the issues raised by
these ideas.
Relative and Absolute Models of Categorization
Traditional models of categorization, such as exemplar models, assume that the
absolute magnitude of a stimulus provides the basis for categorization. MAC models assume
that it is the differences between the current stimulus and recent stimuli that provide the basis
for categorization. We do not wish to suggest that absolute magnitudes are completely
unavailable and unrepresented in the sensory pathways. A simple thought experiment shows
that such a position is untenable. Consider categorizing tones on the basis of their frequency.
The original claim that only the difference between Sn-1 and Sn is used in the decision process
makes the implicit assumption that the absolute magnitude of Sn-1 is temporarily represented:
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Without some temporary memory of the absolute magnitude of the previous stimulus being
maintained over the silent inter-trial interval then it would be impossible to construct or
perceive the difference between the current stimulus and the previous stimulus. Constructing
such a difference involves comparing Sn-1 and Sn, and thus some representation of the absolute
magnitude of Sn-1 must be maintained until, and available when, Sn is perceived.6 The claim that
we are making is that the long-term memory representations of stimuli do not contain absolute
magnitude information (or that if they do, the information is not used in a binary
categorization of tones varying in frequency). Thus, long-term memory representations differ
qualitatively from the representations of current or very recent stimuli. 
Long-Term Frames of Reference
The data of Ward and Lockhead (1970) and Ward (1987) are problematic for the claim
that there is no long-term representation of absolute magnitudes. Stimuli varying in loudness
were used in different psychophysical tasks. Some tasks - absolute identification with
feedback, absolute identification without feedback (i.e., category judgment), and ratio
magnitude estimation of successive stimuli - required participants to make relative judgments
(Ward & Lockhead, 1970; Experiments 1 and 2 of Ward, 1987). Other tasks - absolute
magnitude estimation and cross modality matching (to duration) - required participants to
make absolute judgments (Experiments 3 and 4 of Ward, 1987). For a given task, sessions
were repeated over several days. The crucial manipulation was to vary the loudness of the
stimulus set on different days, by either increasing or decreasing the intensity of all of the
stimuli by a constant. No matter whether the participants were supposed to be making
absolute or relative judgments, judgments in a given session were biased by the stimulus-
response mapping from the previous day's session. Participants had a tendency to respond to
stimuli as if they could partly recall the responses associated with stimuli on the previous day's
session. These data are the strongest evidence we know of for long-term frames in
psychophysical judgment, which in this case are given by the previous day's stimulus-response
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mapping.
How might Ward's data be reconciled with our own? If people can store only a single
frequency in the long-term, they should do very well in a binary categorization by storing a
stimulus at the category boundary, given that adjacent stimuli are easily discriminable. Thus,
we conclude that such a representation is either unavailable or very poor (or "fuzzy", as Ward,
1987, p. 226, suggests). 
Our data concern frequencies of tones; Ward's concerned the loudness of tones. Long-
term absolute magnitudes may be available only for loudnesses, or unavailable only for
frequencies (few people have perfect pitch; about 0.01% of the general population, Takeuchi
& Hulse, 1993). An alternative is that a long-term frame of reference is available for
frequency, but for some reason is not utilized in our task. Certainly, task characteristics seem
to be able to alter the balance between short and long term frames of reference. DeCarlo
showed that a long-term frame of reference was more heavily weighted in a regression
equation fitted to magnitude estimation data when instructions suggested a long-term frame of
reference (DeCarlo & Cross, 1990; DeCarlo, 1994) or when inter-trial intervals were large
(DeCarlo, 1992).7
A second source of evidence that seems problematic for the claim that there are no
long-term frames of reference concerns the ubiquitous bow effect: Typically, performance is
better on extreme stimuli in an absolute identification than for central stimuli (Braida &
Durlach, 1972; Durlach & Braida, 1969; Lacouture, 1997; Lacouture & Marley, 1995; Luce,
Green, & Weber, 1976; Pollack, 1952, 1953; Weber, Green, & Luce, 1977). While the
restricted ability to make mistakes at the ends of the range certainly contributes to the bow
effect, many authors attribute the effect to differential sensitivity along the stimulus range
(Berliner, Durlach, & Braida, 1977; Braida & Durlach, 1972; Luce et al., 1982; Shiffrin &
Nosofsky, 1994) or memory for the extreme stimuli (Berliner & Durlach, 1973; Braida et al.,
1984; Marley & Cook, 1984; see also Gravetter & Lockhead, 1973). However, the bow effect
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can be explained without recourse to long-term frames of reference. Each variant of the MAC
model presented here predicts better performance for extreme stimuli, because extreme stimuli
are more likely to have a sign-useful stimulus in the set of recent stimuli. This approach can
also be applied to absolute identification. Unpublished modeling from our laboratory
demonstrates that a bow effect can be produced if the sign of the difference between the
previous stimulus and the current stimulus is used to restrict the range of possible responses,
from which one is selected at random. This is because the range of possible responses
generated in this way always contains the correct response and, on average, is smaller for
extreme stimuli. Thus the bow effect need not be interpreted as evidence for long-term frames
of reference. 
Reconciling Exemplar and MAC Models
It may seem that the MAC models described here are hard to reconcile with exemplar
models of categorization, that currently dominate the literature. However, Stewart and Brown
(2003) showed that this is not the case. In exemplar models, the similarity between two
exemplars is a function of the difference between them, and thus although exemplar models
assume that absolute magnitudes are available, classification of stimuli depends only on
stimulus differences. 
Stewart and Brown (2003) suggested that the issue of the availability of absolute or
relative magnitudes may be reconceptualized in terms of the availability of exemplars in
memory. Stewart and Brown developed an extension of an exemplar model, the generalized
context model (GCM, Nosofsky, 1986), by modifying the choice rule. The key psychological
claim instantiated in this extension is that not only is the similarity of a novel exemplar to
stored exemplars of a category evidence that the novel exemplar belongs to that category, but
also the dissimilarity to alternative categories. This modification allows a large dissimilarity (or
a small similarity) to count as evidence against category membership (cf. standard models
where very low similarity counts as evidence, albeit very slight, for category membership). The
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original MAC model was shown to be a special case when only recent exemplars were
assumed to be available. When all exemplars were assumed to be available, Stewart and
Brown's extension closely mimics the GCM. Thus, the only real difference between the two
accounts is that the MAC model assumes that only immediately preceding stimuli are
available, and that long-term memory representations of the absolute magnitudes of stimuli
cannot be formed. Conversely, the GCM assumes that every previously encountered
exemplar's absolute magnitude is stored in long-term memory.
Direct or Indirect Availability of Differences
In our extension of the MAC model to utilize information from prior trials other than
the immediately preceding trial, we assumed that the information about previous trials is
directly available. For example, we assume that the difference between Sn and Sn-2 is deduced
by comparing the short-term memory trace of Sn-2 with Sn. An alternative is that such a
comparison is not made because Sn-2 is not available in memory when Sn is encountered.
Instead long-range differences could be deduced by summing intervening consecutive
differences. For example the difference between Sn-2 and Sn might be derived by summing the
difference between Sn-1 and Sn-2 with the difference between Sn and Sn-1. If this is the case, then
why is the magnitude of difference information not used (see Experiment)? It would seem
unlikely that the magnitudes of differences were used to estimate long-range differences, and
yet were not utilized in categorization.8
In the Sign-Only MAC Models that receive support from the Experiment, we assume
that only ordinal judgments are used in a simple binary categorization. It is possible to infer
something about long-range ordinal judgments if only ordinal judgments between consecutive
stimuli are available. Table 2 it is shown that the sign of the Sn-2 - Sn difference can only be
deduced from intervening consecutive differences when Sn-2 - Sn-1 and Sn-1 - Sn are of the same
sign. In these cases either Sn  Sn-1  Sn-2 or Sn  Sn-1  Sn-2. (In the remaining cases the sign
of the Sn-2 - Sn difference can only be deduced if the magnitude of the intervening consecutive
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differences is available.) Thus, Sn-2 can only be sign-useful if its sign is deduced from only
ordinal information about intervening consecutive differences, when Sn-1 is also sign-useful.
The data illustrated in Figure 7B show that Sn-2 is sign-useful even when Sn-1 is not. Thus we
suggest that Sn-2 is not deduced from only ordinal information about intervening consecutive
differences.
To conclude, together the above two arguments suggest that the sign of longer-range
stimulus differences is deduced by comparing Sn directly with the short-term memory trace of
Sn-k. This conclusion necessarily implies that some absolute magnitude information is available,
at least in the short term, for preceding stimuli other than just the immediately preceding
stimulus. 
Relationship to Existing Models
Petzold and Haubensak's (in press) multiple standards model provides an account of
how unidimensional stimuli are categorized. The model uses the nearest upper and lower
reference points taken from the previous two stimuli and the maximum and minimum stimuli.
This selection of reference points is motivated by Haubensak's (1992b) consistency model.
Thus, the relative arrangement of Sn, Sn-1, and Sn-2 determines the reference points selected. For
example, consider the absolute identification of 10 evenly spaced stimuli. If Sn-2 = 6, Sn-1 = 9,
and Sn = 4, then Sn-2 = 6 will be selected as the nearest upper anchor SU and Stimulus 1 will be
selected as the lowest anchor SL. Rn is then generated by linear interpolation (i.e., responding
such that (Rn - RL) / (RU -RL) matches the ratio of the stimulus magnitudes (Sn - SL) / (SU - SL)).
(This covers the case when there are fewer categories than stimuli.) Thus the multiple
standards model differs from the MAC model we advocate as it assumes that (a) absolute
magnitudes are maintained in long-term memory, at least for the extreme stimuli, and (b) that
the magnitudes and signs of the differences are used. However the multiple standards model
and the MAC models described here have in common the assumption that the selection of
stimuli as standards depends on the magnitudes of those stimuli and the magnitudes of other
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recent stimuli.
DeCarlo also suggests that multiple standards might be used in making psychophysical
judgments. In his dynamic theory of proportional judgment (DeCarlo & Cross, 1990; DeCarlo,
1992, 1994), two frames of reference are suggested. One frame comprises a long-term
reference stimulus (perhaps the first stimulus) and the response assigned to it. The other frame
comprises the previous stimulus and the previous response. The relative reliance upon each
frame is modulated by a free parameter. Our data presented in the Experiment and those of
Petzold and Haubensak (2001) described above suggest that the frame of reference may
change on a trial-by-trial basis, depending on the current and immediately preceding stimulus.
Such trial-by-trial changes in the frame of reference could, in principle, be accommodated
within the dynamic theory of proportional judgment by specifying how the free parameter
modulating the relative contributions of each frame might be made to depend on the context
provided by current and recent stimuli. For example. DeCarlo and Cross (1990, p. 387)
provide an account of the observation that the autocorrelation of successive responses is
highest when stimuli are similar (e.g., Baird et al., 1980; Jestead et al., 1977; Schifferstein &
Frijters, 1992) by allowing the free parameter to be proportional to the difference between
successive stimuli. However, for such an approach to be successful in its application to our
data, additional frames of reference would need to be included for Sn-2 and perhaps further
back. This, then, would be a departure from another key aspect of the model which attributes
long range sequential dependencies in the data to the propagation of judgment errors through
successive responses (as described in the Discussion of the Experiment above).
Treisman and Williams (1984) proposed a theory of criterion setting to account for the
sequential effects observed in many psychophysical tasks. The basis of the model is to assume
a Thurstonian sensory scale, which is divided into response categories by criteria. This model
then immediately differs from MAC models by assuming that absolute magnitudes of stimulus
properties are directly available to the decision process. Two opposing, short-term
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mechanisms act on the criteria on a trial-by-trial basis. First, a tracking mechanism, motivated
by the assumption that objects in the real world tend to persist (Treisman & Williams, 1984, p.
94), moves criteria away from the currently perceived sensory effect. This increases the
probability of repeating the response associated with the stimulus that was most likely to have
caused that sensory effect. Second, a stabilizing mechanism acts to locate criteria nearer to the
prevailing flux of sensory inputs to increase the amount of information transmitted (Treisman
& Williams, 1984, p. 94). The stabilizing mechanism acts in opposition to the tracking
mechanism, and Treisman and Williams suggest that these two mechanisms are each affected
by different variables. The model can, in principle, account for the category contrast effect, if
it is assumed that the stabilization mechanism dominates. For example, consider in our
experiment, Stimulus 1 followed by Stimulus 5. Stimulus 1 would cause the category bound to
move down the scale. Thus, Stimulus 5 is now more likely to be categorized into Category B,
as seen in the category contrast effect. If Stimulus 10 precedes Stimulus 5, then the stabilizing
mechanism will move the bound up the scale, making a Category A response to Stimulus 5
more likely. 
We cannot see a clear theoretical motivation for assuming that stabilization should
dominate in an binary categorization task with feedback. Such an argument would have to rest
on the task properties specific to binary categorization favoring stabilization over tracking.
Treisman and Williams (1984, pp. 103-104) suggest that feedback should reduce tracking as
bounds are only modified by tracking when the correct response is given. This argument
predicts that as the number of categories is reduced in a categorization task and accuracy rises,
tracking should be increased. Thus more assimilation is predicted. Treisman and Williams also
suggest that stabilization should increase as the number of categories increases (p. 104). Thus,
with few categories there should be little stabilization. In summary, these two arguments
predict that tracking should dominate stabilization, which in turn would predict a category
assimilation effect. 
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Further, the criterion-setting model cannot account for the interaction between the
effects of previous stimuli seen in Petzold and Haubensak's (2001) data, as Petzold and
Haubensak themselves point out (p. 970), or the interactions in our data, as the effect of
previous trials is accumulated in a linear sum (Treisman & Williams, 1984, p. 75). Despite this
failure, the generality of the criterion-setting model suggests that it should be pursued as an
account of sequential effects.
In applying the judgment option model (a component of complementarity theory) to
category judgment, Baird (1997) classifies contextual effects as a product of the response
process, as we do in our MAC models. Specifically, his model assumes that variability in
psychophysical judgment can be attributed to uncertainty about which response should be
associated with a given stimulus. Baird's model differs from the MAC models in that absolute
magnitudes of stimuli are assumed to be available. Participants are assumed to use stimulus-
response pairings, which, following Haubsensak (1992b), are determined by the responses
early in the experimental session. Subsequently, the rank-order decision rule is used within the
judgment option model, whereby participants give responses that follow the same rank order
as the stimuli. Baird discusses the example for a binary categorization (p. 209), giving three
explicit rules: (a) if Sn = Sn-1, Rn = Rn-1, (b) if Sn > Sn-1, Rn = Catgeory B, (c) if Sn < Sn-1, Rn =
Category A. These rules bear some relation to the concept of sign-usefulness we introduced
earlier. However, Baird's rules are more generally applicable. Our data do not support this
generality. For example, (b) suggests that if Stimulus 1 is judged as Category A, then any
larger subsequent stimulus should be judged Category B. Figure 6 shows that this is not the
case. When Stimuli 2-5 follow Stimulus 1, they are more often categorized into Category A.
Although Baird's complementarity theory is considerably more general than our MAC models,
it does not offer an obvious account of the sequential effects in our data. 
 Laming (1997) argues that the judgments underlying performance in many
psychophysical tasks are no better than ordinal (i.e., 'greater than', 'the same as', and 'less
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than'). This argument was motivated by the observation that the variability in performance in
magnitude estimation, absolute identification, and cross-modal matching is typically several
orders of magnitude greater than that which is associated with discrimination of the same
stimuli. Laming then demonstrates that ordinal judgments of this kind are sufficient to explain
much of the data from psychophysical experiments, to explain the dependency of the results on
the range of stimuli selected for the experiment, and to explain the sequential effects observed
in these tasks. The data we present in this Experiment are consistent with Laming's assumption
that judgments are ordinal, and this assumption is at the core of the MAC model that we
present to account for the data. Where we differ from Laming is in assuming that ordinal
judgments are not just possible for the comparison of the immediately preceding stimulus with
the current stimulus, but also for other very recent stimuli. Our MAC model is consistent with
Laming's key claim: that there is no internal scale of sensation and that instead, judgment is
relative to the context in which stimuli are presented.
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Footnotes
1Mathematica code is available for these models from Neil Stewart.
2The degrees of freedom do not match in these two ANOVAs because of missing
values: Because of the truly random selection of stimuli, not all cells in the design contained
data from every participant.
3In the original category contrast experiment (Stewart, et al., 2002) the category
contrast effect was based on 10 participants each responding to 400 borderline stimuli after
extreme stimuli. In the present experiment, which was not designed specifically to detect this
effect, the category contrast effect is based upon data from 16 participants each making, on
average, only 23.8 critical responses. The reduced power in the current design is probably
responsible for the failure to replicate the category contrast effect using Stewart et al.'s (2002)
analysis.
An alternative suggestion is that the category contrast effect in the current data might
be smaller because the spacing between the stimuli was increased from 1% in Stewart et al.'s
(2002) study to 6% in the current study. However, this increase in spacing had only a very
slight effect on the proportion of correct responses averaged over all stimuli (84.1% originally
verses 85% now). This is in line with similar results in absolute identification that show that,
once adjacent stimuli are discriminable, increasing the range has only a very small effect
(Braida & Durlach, 1972; Pollack, 1952). We conclude that it is the lack of power rather than
the altered stimulus spacing that is responsible for the marginal category contrast effect seen
here.
4It is not possible to examine the complete three-way interaction between Sn, Sn-1, and
Sn-2, as there are insufficient data. To collect sufficient data, each participant would need to
complete approximately 10,000 trials.
5There is some evidence that the magnitude of the difference between stimuli might be
being used. Performance on the extreme stimuli, Stimuli 1 and 10, is good, no matter what the
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preceding stimulus is. The Sign-Only MAC models predict that performance should be better
when the preceding stimulus is from the same category (as these stimuli will always be sign-
useful) compared to the case when the preceding stimulus is from the opposite category (as
these stimuli will never be sign-useful). This prediction is dependent on other recent stimuli
also not being sign-useful. As the probability that other stimuli can be recalled rises, this effect
is predicted to get smaller. However, if the magnitude of the difference is also available, then
the preceding stimulus will either be sign-useful (if it is from the same category) or sufficiently
different to promote a swap from the previous feedback to the current response (if it is from
the opposite category) (see Figure 4A). If only coarse difference magnitude information is
available, as Laming (1997) suggests, this would probably be sufficient. We would like to
thank Shuji Mori for this observation.
6In addition to this point, there is good neurophysiological evidence that absolute
magnitudes are represented in sensory pathways. For example, auditory nerve fibers are tuned
to specific frequencies (e.g., Kiang, 1975) and neurons in the auditory cortex are arranged in
tonotopic maps (e.g., Abeles & Goldstein, 1970). 
7An alternative is that these manipulations encourage a more even weighting of recent
trials (i.e., Sn-1, Sn-2, Sn-3, ...). On average, this would appear as a reduced effect of trial n-1 and
an increased contribution from a long-term frame of reference.
8The issue of whether Sn - Sn-2 is available directly or must be deduced by summing Sn-2
- Sn-1 and Sn-1 - Sn can be determined by examining the variability in responding on trials n-1
and n. The argument is as follows. If Sn - Sn-2 is the sum of Sn-2 - Sn-1 and Sn-1 - Sn then Var(Sn -
Sn-2) = Var(Sn-2 - Sn-1) + Var(Sn-1 - Sn). Thus Var(Sn - Sn-2)  Var(Sn-1 - Sn). Thus, if
information from trial n-2 is used in addition to information from trial n-1, it cannot reduce the
variability in responding to Sn if any weighted average of the two sources of information is
used (as in Equation 2). This is, of course, not necessarily the case if Sn - Sn-2 and Sn-1 - Sn
interact in producing Rn (as in the Experiment and Petzold & Haubensak, 2001). 
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Table 1
A: States of the Availability of Previous Stimuli
Stimulus Availability
Sn-1 Sn-2 Sn-3 State Probability
0 0 0 (1 - p1) (1 - p2) (1 - p3)
0 0 1 (1 - p1) (1 - p2) p3
0 1 0 (1 - p1) p2 (1 - p3)
0 1 1 (1 - p1) p2 p3
1 0 0 p1 (1 - p2) (1 - p3)
1 0 1 p1 (1 - p2) p3
1 1 0 p1 p2 (1 - p3)
1 1 1 p1 p2 p3
Note. 0 denotes 'unavailable' and 1 denotes 'available'.
B: An Example for the Category Structure in Figure 1 when Sn = 3
Stimulus Availability
Sn-1 = 7 Sn-2 = 5 Sn-3 = 2 State Probability







0 0 0 .028 No None
0 0 1 .012 No Sn-3
0 1 0 .042 Yes, Sn-2 Sn-2
0 1 1 .018 Yes, Sn-2 Sn-2
1 0 0 .252 No Sn-1
1 0 1 .108 No Sn-1
1 1 0 .378 Yes, Sn-2 Sn-1
1 1 1 .162 Yes, Sn-2 Sn-1
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Table 2
Inferring Long-Range Ordinal Relationships from Consecutive Ordinal Judgments
Sn-2 - Sn-1 Sn-1 - Sn
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Ten stimuli distributed evenly along a single psychological dimension divided into
two categories.
Figure 2. Predictions of the Feedback Repetition MAC Model (b). A: The probability of a
correct Rn as a function of Sn-1 for different Sn. B: The probability of a correct Rn as a function
of Sn-2 for different Sn. C: The probability of a correct Rn as a function of Sn-1 and Sn-2 when Sn =
4. 
Figure 3. Predictions of the Recalled Stimulus MAC Model (c). A: The probability of a
correct r Rn as a function of Sn-1 for different Sn. B: The probability of a correct Rn as a function
of Sn-2 for different Sn. C: The probability of a correct Rn as a function of Sn-1 and Sn-2 when Sn =
4. 
Figure 4. Predictions of the Sign and Magnitude MAC Model (d). A: The probability of a
correct Rn as a function of Sn-1 for different Sn. B: The probability of a correct Rn as a function
of Sn-2 for different Sn. C: The probability of a correct Rn as a function of Sn-1 and Sn-2 when Sn =
4. 
Figure 5. The mean proportion of correct Rn as a function of Sn in the Experiment.
Performance has been collapsed across categories (i.e., Sn = 1 represents performance
averaged across Stimuli 1 and 10, Sn = 2 represents performance averaged across Stimuli 2 and
9, and so on). Error bars represent the standard errors of the means. 
Figure 6. Sequential effects in the Experiment. A: The mean proportion of correct Rn as a
function of Sn-1 for different Sn. B: The mean proportion of correct Rn as a function of Sn-2 for
different Sn. Performance has been collapsed across categories. Error bars represent the
standard errors of the means. 
Figure 7. Conditional sequential effects in the Experiment. A: The mean proportion of correct
Rn only when the Sn-1 is sign-useful as a function of Sn-2 for different Sn. B: The mean
proportion of correct Rn only when the Sn-1 is not sign-useful as a function of Sn-2 for different
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Sn. C: The mean proportion of correct Rn only when the Sn-2 is sign-useful as a function of Sn-1
for different Sn. D: The mean proportion of correct Rn only when the Sn-2 is not sign-useful as a
function of Sn-1 for different Sn. 
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Figure 1
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